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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  examines  several  aspects of the debate  about  the causes  of 
the U.S.  current  account deficit  in the 1980's.  It surveys  several popular 
explanations  before developing  two theoreticsl  models of international 
capital  flows.  The first model is Ricardian,  and it extends  the analysis  of 
Stockman  and Svensson  (1987):  The second  model is an overlapping 
generations  framework.  The major  difference  in  predictions  of these  two 
models  involves  the effects  of  government  budget  deficits  on the exchange 
rate and the current  account.  An update  of the empirical  investigation  of 
Evans  (1986) suggests  that  his VAR methodology  is completely  uninformative 
with additional  data.  Some empirical  results  on  the importance  of risk 
aversion  in modeling  international  capital market  equilibrium  are also 
presented. 
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for discussion  of the policy issues that  are inherent  in  the analysis.  Is 
the current  account  deficit  a major  policy  problem  that must  receive  high 
political  priority?  Has the U.S. become  unable  to compete  abroad,  or is the 
current  account  merely  reflecting  normal  fluctuations  associated  with 
cyclical  fluctuations  and differential  growth  rates  across  countries?  Are we 
impoverishing  future  generations  by acquiring  a massive  amount of net foreign 
liabLtties?  Should  we adopt protectionist  policies  that  will cut the inflow 
of imports?  Must  we have either  further  depreciation  of the dollar or 
protection  of our industries,  as Rudiger  Dornbusch  (1987)  argues,  if we are 
to achieve  external  balance without  inducing  a recession? 
These  are important  and difficult  questions,  and I will return  to them 
briefly in  the conclusion  of  the paper.  My primary  purpose, though, is to 
ask  how we should  attempt  to model  these  ideas, and to examine  two approaches 
that  place other research  in  perspective. 
I first  examine  the data in  a graphical way to summarize  the issues.  I 
next discuss  some  conventional  wisdom  that is often  cited  in policy 
discussions  and the popular  press  as explanations  of  U.S.  capital  flows. 
This analysis  focuses  on differential  growth rates of real income  and demand 
in the U.S.  and abroad,  on the real value  of che dollar  in foreign  exchange 
markets,  and on the federal budget  deficit of the Reagan  administration, 
which  is seen  as one of the driving forces  in the appreciation  of the dollar. 
This,  in  turn,  is thought  to be a major  cause  of the deterioration  in  the 
balance of  trade.  I  then  discuss  two types of dynamic  economic  theoretical 
models that could  provide  explanations  of  the phenomena. 
The first theoretical  model is a  version  of the Lucas  (1982) model that 
has become  a workhorse  of international  financial  asset  pricing.  I extend 
the analysis  of Stockman  and Svenaaon  (1987) who first  explored  capital  flows Explanations  of Larse  Econometric  Models 
The deterioration  of the current  account has been the focus  of a number  of 
recent  studies  employing  large  econometric  models,  and these  studies  support 
the hypothesis  that less  has changed  than one might  have thought  from  a 
casual  glance  at Figure  1.  The results  of  several  forecasting  experiments 
are reported  in  Bryant,  Holtham  and Hooper  (1988).  Bryant  and Holtham  (1988) 
report  the results  of forecasting  experiments  from  eight large models,  and 
Helkie  and  Hooper (1988) report  the results of a partial equilibrium  analysis 
that is essentially  based on the U.S current  account  sector  of the Federal 
Reserve Board  Multicountry  Model. 
Given the Lucas  (1976) critique  of  the prectice  of building  econometric 
models  without explicit  consideration  of  the maximizing  problems  of economic 
agents,  it seems unlikely to me that the large  econometric  models  are 
capturing  the true economic  structure  in the economy.  Nevertheless,  the 
models  do incorporate  income and substitution  effects  of current  and lagged 
variables,  and it is interesting  to ask  how well the models  predicted  the 
current  account  deficit  of the 1980's given  their historical  parameter  values 
estimated  until 1980 and the out-of-sample  values  of real GNP in  the U.S.  and 
abroad,  the respective  rates  of capacity utilization,  and the course  of real 
exchange  rates.  This is the experiment  reported  in Bryant  and  Holtham (1988) 
who conclude (p.59),  "past macroeconomic  relationships  can successfully 
predict  the deterioration  of the U.S. external  imbalance... (since) the 
predictions  were often  within  a few  billion  dollars of the actual  deficit  in 
1986, more than five  years after  the start of the dynamic  simulations." 
One major reason  why large econometric  models  are not considered 
structural  is that the distributed  lags  in  their  decision  rules  often  can  be 
shown to be a confounding  of the equilibrium  dynamic  distributed  lag 6 
responses  of agents  due to various  costs of adjustment  with the distributed 
lags necessary  to forecast  relevant  state variables.  If the large 
econometric  models  continue  to track  the current  account in dynamic 
simulations,  one reason  may be that the forecasting  problem  has not changed. 
In this sense  the structure  of  the economy  is not different. 
Similarly  successful  out-of-sample  forecasting  results  are reported  by 
Helkie  and Hooper (1988).  Their  model  breaks  the current  account  into a 
nineteen  equation  system  with the major  component,  merchandise  trade, being 
comprised  of an eight equation  system.  Four  equations  are for the volumes of 
imports  and exports  of agricultural  and nonagricultural  commodities.  A  fifth 
models  U.S.  oil consumption,  and three equations  are for the relative  prices 
of exports  of agricultural  and nonagricultural  commodities  and of nonoil 
imports.  The specificatioti has been subject  to considerable  search,  as 
evidenced  by the differences  across  the lag lengths  of relative  price 
variables  in  the various  equations.  The authors  also admit  that some  of the 
variables  are sd hot adjustments  included  becsuse  of deficiencies  in  the 
data.  Nevertheless,  Helkie  and Hooper (1988) find  that the post-sample 
(1985-86) performance  of their model has smaller  root mesn squsred  prediction 
errors than the average  in-sample  errors. 
Given that  large  econometric  models with ex post  values of real  incomes 
and relative  price  variables  can track the current  account,  is it fair to 
conclude  that the structure  of the world  has not changed?  It seems  that the 
answer  is yes,  and the  interesting  issue becomes  what sre the sources  of the 
fluctuations  in these variables. 
The 1987 Economic  Reoort  of the President  states  (p. 9?),  "Underlying 
these  developments  are several  macroeconomic  imbalances,  including  the 
deterioration  of the U.S.  saving-investment  balance that  has resulted  from 13 
—  +  -  (9) 
where the long-run levels  are not constant.  The long-run  level  of net 
foreign  assets depends  upon the discounted  present  value of target foreign 
assets,  and the long-run  level of the real exchange  rate depends both upon 
the long-run  level of  net foreign  assets and upon the discounted  present 
value  of the exogenous  excess demand  shifts  that  are both  domestic  and 
foreign  in origin  as in 
— (1  - 
nYeiEt[At+.] 
(10) 
j  —0 
and 
- (r/)A  + (1 
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(11) 
j  —0 
Although  the relationship  between  the current  account  and the real 
exchange  rate is simple,  if  one knows z, there need not be a  well defined 
relationship  between  the level of the real  exthange  rate that clears  the 
balance of payments  at a particular  point in time and the magnitude  of the 
current  account  when that  real  exchange  rate is at that same level at some 
other point in  time. 
The inadequacy  of the model of  this section  is highlighted  by its 
inability  to address  interesting  policy  issues.  Although  it is a rational 
expectations  model,  it does  not have firm  microeconomic  foundations  for its 
expenditure  and excess  demand  functions.  We also need information  on 
expected  future  values  of  exogenous  variables  that shift  excess demand 
functions  toward  and away from  U.S.  goods. 
Adequate  economic  models  of  the current  account  and capital  flows  should 
be based on maximizing  behavior,  should  be explicitly  stochastic  so that they 14 
may be addressed  to data,  and ahould  account  for growth  of real income  and 
for the role of the government  sector  in  the economy.  Given the importance 
of expectations  of  the future  in equation  (11),  current  modeling strategies 
dictate  that the model  should  also  have rational  expectations.  I  therefore 
turn to the discussion  of such  models. 
A Ricardian  Model 
The purpose  of this section  is to lay out an explicitly  maximizing 
rational  expectations  model that  has been  used to address  issues of exchange 
rate determination,  international  financial  asset pricing,  and capital  flows. 
The section  builds  heavily  on Stockman  and Svensson (1987).  My basic  purpose 
here is to add government  sectors  to their  frsmework.5 
Countries  and Production  Possibilities 
There are two countries,' denoted  country  one and country  two, that each 
produce  a distinct  good  denoted  lt 
and "2  respectively.  The goods  are 
produced  with the following  production  functions: 
Y.  — Y.(K.  ,  c.  )  i —  1,  2,  it  1  it  it 
where 
K.t 
is the capital  stock  employed  in country  i, i — 1,  2,  at time t, 
and Lit LS a stochastic  productivity  shock.  The capital  stocks  are 
predetermined  at time t.  The productivity  shocks  are in the time t 
information  set and are assumed  to be independently  and identically 
distributed. 
The arrangement  of markets  for goods  and assets  follows  the original 
timing  of the Svensson  (1985) model  with the goods market open  in the 
beginning  of a period  after the realization  of the state.  Agents are 
constrained  to purchase  goods  with  monies  csrried  into the period from the 
time t-l asset market.  After the closing  of the goods  market,  the asset 17 
values  of assets  and prices  and the equilibrium  decisions  of agents  are not 
altered  by changes  in the timing of debt and taxes.  Hence, budget deficits 
cannot  affect  capital  flows  in  this model. 
Preferences  and Budget  Constraints 
The preferences  of agents  in each country  are assumed to be homothetic  and 
identical.  Agents  trade  in a number  of different  assets  including  the monies 
and government  bonds of the two countries,  the titles  to the outputs  of the 
firms  in the two countries,  and tax-related  assets  that facilitate  the 
discussion  of an equilibrium. 
The objective  function  of the representative  consumer  of either  country  is 
to maximize  expected  lifetime  utility  as in 
{  C)} 
0 < $ <  1,  (15) 
by choice  of consumption  of the good of country  one, C1t 
and consumption  of 
the good of country  two, Cpu. 
In equation (15), E0(•)  is the expectation 
operator  conditional  on initial  information  in period  zero,  and $ is  the 
subjective  discount  factor.  The period  utility  function,  U(•,•),  is 
sufficiently  concave  that the Inada conditions  are satisfied  and an internal 
equilibrium  is  guaranteed.  Agents  are assumed  to receive  either  no utility 
from  government  purchases  of  goods  or utility that  is separable  from  the 
utility of other  goods. 
I follow  Stockman  and Svensson (1987) and assume  that the purchase  of an 
equity  share  carries  with it the commitment  to purchase  a pro rats share  of 
the investment  of the representative  firm in  capital  next  period.  If  is 
the ownership  of share i,  i — 1,  2, the commitment  is to purchase  Z.K.t÷1 
units  of output  of good  i for the firm  at the time t goods market. 
Information  relevant  to the decisions  for the period  is obtained  at the 18 
beginning  of the period.  At that  tine the representative  consumer faces two 
cash-in-advance  constraints  that dictate  the quantities  of each good that  can 
be consumed.  In  the period  t-l asset  market  the representative  agents 
acquire M?  of currency  i.  The cash-in-advance  constraints  are 
+  ￿  M,  (16) 
P2tC2t  + P2tZ2tK2t s 4.  (17) 
The agent's budget constraint  during  the asset  market  requires  that the 
value of the purchases  of assets be less than  or equal  to wealth  at that 
time.  Sources  of wealth  are the values  of the existing  shares  in the firms, 
any unspent  monies  from the goods  markets,  any state-contingent  payoffs on 
government  bonds,  and the payoffs  on the tax-related  assets. 
Let 8(x)  denote  the amount  of money i that  the consumer  of country  1 
purchased  at the time c-i asset  market  for delivery  at the time t asset 
market  conditional  on the state being x.  Let  and Z  be the holdings  of 
the consumer  of country  i of the tax-related  assets of country  one and 
country  two respectively.  The uses of wealth include  tax liabilities  and 
purchases  of new assets. 
The budget constraint  in period  t of the agent  of country  one is therefore 
+ 5tMt÷i 
+ 
fn1(xt1 x)B(x ltl 
+ 
5tfn2(xt÷1 
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times  the marginal  utility  of wealth  in that state  times  the probability  of 
that state  being  realized.  These equations  must  hold for all possible  future 
states. 
Investment  Decisions  of Firms 
The values  of the fins depend  on  the capital  stocks and the optimal 
investment  decisions,  K.t+. 
for i — 1,  2 and j — 1, 2,.., that are 
functions  of the state  at time  t+j-1.  The firms  are assumed  to pay out all 
of their  revenue  as dividends;  hence  Dlt 
—  and  D2t 
— 
Maximization  of  the values  of  the firms  requires  them to have contingency 
plans  for the capital  stocks  such that 
Kit÷i equates  the  marginal  utility 
that must  be sacrificed  if an additional  unit of investment  is made in the 
capital  stock  to the discounted  expected  marginal  utility  gains  from  having 
an additional  unit of the oapital  stock. 
Definition  of an Equilibrium 
Given the setup of the model at this  point,  it is now possible to define 
an  equilibrium.  The only equilibrium  I consider  is the perfectly  pooled 
stationary  equilibrium  of Lucas  (1982) who noted  that if agents  have the same 
preferences  and if preferences  are homothetic,  the ratios  of consumptions  of 
the goods  will  be identical  across  countries.  The perfectly  pooled 
equilibrium  arises  when agents  have identical  wealth  as  well,  and therefore 
their  consumption  is the same.  If the agents  in each country  are endowed 
initially  with the ownership  of  the production  process  of their  country  and 
are liable  for the taxes of their  country,  the perfectly  pooled  equilibrium 
requires  that  at initial prices,  the wealths  of the two countries  happen to 
be the same.  Different  levels  of wealth  will result  in different  equilibrium 
consumption  levels,  but with the homothetic  preferences,  asset  prices  will  be 
identical. 22 
In the pooled  equilibrium  agents  share  equally  the available  outputs  of 
the two goods  net of government  consumption  of the two countries  and of the 
endogenous  investment  decisions  of the firms,  and  they  hold half of the 
outstanding  stocks of the fins and the monies  with the outstanding  number  of 
shares  in the fins normalized  to be one.  The tax-related  assets  are in zero 
net supply  in the world.  Since each citizen  is liable  for the taxes  of his 
country,  the agent  of country  one holds  an asset  that is the liability  of the 
agent  of country  two, and the asset  provides  contingent  deliveries  of dollars 
equal  to half of the country  one contingent  tax liability.  The agent  of 
country  two also  holds a similar  asset  that  is the liability  of the agent  of 
country  one. 
Net Foreign  Assets  and Capital  Flows 
The total dollar value Of world assets in positive  aupply  consists  of the 
dollar  value of  the two production  processes,  the dollar  value  of the money 
stocks,  and the dollar  value  of outstanding  government  bonds.  In the pooled 
equilibrium,  the representative  agent  of each country owns  half of each of 
these  assets.  In  addition,  the agent of country  one owns  the tax-related 
asset that is the liability  of the agent  of country  two;  similarly,  the agent 
of country  two owns the tax-related  asset  that is the liability  of the agent 
of country  one. 
Net foreign  assets  of country  one in  the asset market  at time  t are 
denoted Ait+1.  They  sre defined  to be the value  of country  two assets  owned 
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From  the definitions  of the current  account  and the capital  account,  the 23 
current  account  surplus  of country  one is its capital  account  deficit,  which 





Although  it  appears  from  the definition  of 
Alt+l 
in equation  (20)  that  the 
current  account  ought  to depend  on government  bonds  and taxes,  one major 
point  about the equilibrium  of this  model  is that  the values  of net foteign 
assets  do not depend  directly  on the financing  of the government  sector. 
To see why,  consider  the dollar  value  of the tax-related  asset whose 
payoff  is perfectly  correlated  with the taxes of country  one.  The 
equilibrium  price  of the asset  is found  from  discounting  the value  of its 
payoffs,  which is 
3t  — 
[1/2  1t÷]41[nl(x÷k xt÷kl)dxt÷k]  (22) 
and from  equation  (14) 
- 
Jn1(xt1  x)Bi(x÷1)&c÷1 
— 
(23) 
-  - 
xt+kl)dxt+k] 
j  —l 
where the left-hand  side of equation (23) is what appears  in  the definition 
of Alt+l in equation  (20) and the right-hand  side of equation (23) is the 
present  value of  nominal  government  spending  beginning in  period  t+1 in 
excess of what is financed  by money creation.  The time  pattern of taxation 
and bond financing  of country  one does  not enter  the value  of net foreign 
assets and cannot  be a determinant  of capital  flows.  A  similar  argument 
would apply  to the government  financing  policies  of country  two.  The next 
section  exsmines  a model in  which the financing  of government  debt does 24 
affect  the equilibrium  of the world  economy. 
The model of this section  is a logical  extension  of the real  business 
cycle  models  that  are the focus  of much macroeconomic  research.6 Capital 
flows  in this economy  are simply  the response  to equilibrium  risk sharing. 
Things  that increase  the value  of country  one's technology  will lead to a 
measured  capital  outflow  because they increase  the wealth  of the foreigner. 
Stockman  and Svensson  (1987)  demonstrate  how additional  covariances  of 
capital  flows and other  endogenous  variables  can be calculated  from the 
model.  I  do not undertake  any of these  exercises  because of  the simplicity 
of the driving  processes.  Solving  the model  with  more realistic  driving 
processes  appears  to require  numerical  methods. 
A Two-Country  Overlapping  Generations  Model 
This section  develops  a'model  of maximizing  rational  agents  in a 
stochastic  environment.  Because  agents  have finite  lives and do not form 
intergenerational  families,  the time pattern  of government  debt  does matter 
in a fundamental  way in this equilibrium. 
Preferences  and Technologies 
Consider  a two country  model  of a one good  economy.  The world  is 
populated  with overlapping  generations  of agents  who live for two periods, 
working only in  the first.  Labor  and capital  are used to produce  a good that 
may be consumed  or invested  to become  capital  that is employed  the following 
period.  Each country's  government  buys some of the consumption  good,  taxes 
the young and issues government  bonds. 
The preferences  of agents born at time t are identical  across  countries 
and are given  by 
loB(Ciyt) 
÷ 
$EIJog(C.  ÷1fl, 
1  — 1,  2.  (24) 
where 
Ciyt 
is consumption  of  the young  agent  of country  I at time t, 25 
is consumption  of the old agent  of country  i at time  t+l.  The population  of 
the generation  born at time t in country  i  is denoted  1 — 1,  2. 
Population  growth  is assumed  to be an exogenous  stochastic  process. 
Assume that  an agent  supplies  a unit of labor inelastically  when young  and 
consumes  his savings  when  old.  The first period  budget  constraint  is 
C.  — W.  — r.  —  S.  ,  i — 1,  2,  (25) 
iyt  it  it  it 
where  W.  is the real  wage rate in country  i,  r.  is the head tax of 
it  it 
government  i paid only  by the young,  and Sit is the savings  of the young. 
I assume  that there is a  world rental  market  for capital.  If the atate  of 
the world is known  before  capital has to be allocated,  the rate of return  to 
capital,  denoted  rt 
will  be identical  across  countries.  Since  there are 
stochastic  elements  in the production  process,  rt 
will  be stochastic  when 
viewed  from  periods  before  the allocation  of capital. 
I  also assume  a world  bond market  for government  debt.  The government 
bonds  of countries  will only  be held if they offer  a common  competitive  rate 
of  return,  tbt that  will be determined  in equilibrium  at time t-l when the 
bonds  are issued.  I assume  that the government  bonds  are default  free and 
riskless  in  terms  of consumption  goods. 
Let  be the share  of  savings  in either  country  at time t that is 
allocated  to risky  capital.  Since preferences  are the same,  the portfolio 
shares of the two agents  are the same.  The budget  constraints  of the old are 
C.÷1 
— [(1  ÷ rbl) 
+ e5+1(r 1 
— rbl)IS.  i — 1,  2.  (26) 
The  technology  is assumed  to be constant  returns  to scale  with stochastic 
productivity.  The parameters  of the production  function  are the same  across 
countries,  but the productivity  shocks  are not common.  I follow  King, 
Plosser,  and Rebelo (1988) and specify  the technology  as 26 
Y.  —  W.  K.m(N.  r.  )1m,  t  1,  2.  (27) 
it  i.tit  itit 
where rt 
is labor  augmenting  technological  change,  which is assumed  to be a 
nonstationary  stochastic  process,  is a stationary  stochastic  process 
representing  an overall  productivity  shock, K.t 
is the amount of capital 
allocated  to the ith country,  and full  employment  is assumed. 
Competition  for capital  across  the countries  produces  a rate of return  to 
capital that is its marginal  product  of  capital.  The two wage rates  will be 
different,  though,  since  labor  is not mobile  across  countries  and technology 
is not identical  at a  point in  time.  The wage rates  will be the marginal 
products  of labor. 
Covernznent Budget  Constraints 
Covernment  purchases  of goods  are financed  through  taxation  of the 
working young and issuance  of government  bonds.  Let Gt  be the purchases of 
goods  and B  be the bonds issued  by government  i at time t.  Then,  the 
government  budget  constraint  in period  t is 
C.  + r  8.  — N.  r.  + B.  — B.  i — 1, 2.  (28)  it  bt it  it it  it+l  it 
If government  expenditures  are an  exogenous  stochastic  process,  taxation 
must be endogenous  to keep government  debt bounded.  One process  that does 
this and that is consistent  with the stylized  facts  that  government  debt 
tends  to decline  over time  after  large  expenditures  is 
— T. +  i  1,  2.  (29) 
In equation (29) T.t 
is an exogenous  part of the aggregate  tax system, but 
pB  makes aggregate  taxes  endogenous.  Since  there  is population  growth  and 
technological  change,  government  bonds  can grow over time, but the value of p 
can be chosen  to be sufficiently  large  that appropriately  deflated  debt 
declines  over time if the required  tate of return  on debt and the deflated 27 
levels of exogenous  spending  and taxes are at their unconditional  expected 
values  with debt  above its unconditional  mean. 
Eouilibrium  Conditions 
Three  markets  must clear  each  period.  In asset  markets,  the capital 
created in the previous  period  must  be fully  employed  and the new stocks  of 
government  debt  must be demanded  by the savings  of  the young.  Equilibrium  in 
the goods market  requires  that the supply of  goods  from  production in the two 
countries  and from  previous  capital  stocks be purchased  for conaumption  of 
the young and the old,  for the government  sectors  and for investmenta  in 
capital  goods.  When any two of these markets  clear, the third  is in 
equilibrium  when  agents  satisfy  their  budget  constraints. 
The balance  of payments  also tan be derived  from  these  conditions.  The 
trade  account  surplus  of câuntry  one, TAlt 
is the excess  of production  in 
the country  over the total  expenditure  by the country  for consumption  goods, 
government  goods  and net investment.  Therefore, 




—  —  t+lNltSlt 
— eN11s11).  (30) 
The current  account  surplus  of country  one, CAlt is obtained  by adding 
the service  account  surplus  to the trade balance.  The service  account 
surplus,  SA1t is income  on net foreign  assets.  This is the sum of the 
interest  income  on the ownership  of government  bonds  by country  one residents 
net of total  interest  paid  by their government  and the return  on capital 
owned  by country  one net of  tie total  payments  to capital  employed in  the 
country.  Therefore,  the service  account  surplus  of country  one is 
SA1t  — rb[(l 
— 8t)Nlt lSltl — 
81t1 
+ r[eN1 1S1t1 
— 
and the current  account  surplus  is CA1 
— TAlt 
+ SAlt. 
By substitution  of the budget  constraints  of the individuals  and the 28 
governments,  the current  account  here is the change in  the net ownership  of 
government  bonds,  as in 
CAlt  [(1— e  1)N1S1 
— 
5lt÷11 
— t(l — e  )N1  l5lt 1 
— 5lt1  (32) 
Since physical  capital  is mobile  across  countries,  ex ante  net foreign  assets 
are not well defined,  but ex post  net foreign assets  are 
A  — [e  N  S  —K  I  + [(1—9  )N  5  —B  [.  (33) 
lt÷l  t+l lt lt  lt+l  t+l  lt lt  lt÷l 
The Allocation  of Caoital 
Let the aggregate  amount  of capital  in period  t be denoted  Mt.  The four 
production  efficiency  conditions  relating  the marginal  products  of the 
factors  of production  to the wage rates and the common  rental  rate on capital 
can be combined  with the capital  market  equilibrium  condition  to determine 
the allocation  of capital  across  countries  and the returns  to the factors  of 
production  as functions  of the 
Mt 
and the productivity  shocks.  The stock  of 





with the remainder  employed  in country  two, where the allocation  of capital 
is detemined  by °lt 
— 
The technology  and population  shocks affect  the allocation  of a given 
amount  of  capital  by shifting  capital  to the country  that is relatively  more 
productive,  either  because  there  are more  workers  for a given  unit of capital 
or because  labor  is more productive. 
Consumption.  Savings  and Portfolio  Decisions 
Given  the wage rates  in the two countries,  consumption,  savings,  and 
portfolio  allocations  are found  as the first order  conditions  of the agents' 
maximization  problems.  With logarithmic  preferences  consumption  is a 29 
constant  fraction  of after  tax wealth,  and savings  is 
— $/(l+fl)](Wt 
—  i  — 1,  2.  (35) 
The portfolio  choice  of  the agent  solves 
(ri 
— rbEl)  1 
£4 
[1 + rb+l + 
e1  1(r+1 
— rbl)] J 
— 0.  (36) 
The choice  of 
8t+l 
sets the conditional  expectation  of the product of the 
marginal  utility of second  period  consumption  and the difference  between  the 
two returns  equal  to zero. 
Discussion  of the equilibrium  dynamics  of the capital  stocks requires 
linearizations,  the linearized  version  of equation (36) is simply  rb+l 
The required  return  on  the government  bond must adjust  to be equal 
to the expected  return  on the capital  stock  in period t+l, which will depend 
on the amount  of investment  and on the expected  productivity  of  capital. 
Equilibrium  Dynamics 
The evolution  of the stocks of  capital  and bonds  provides  the dynamics  of 
the model.  The capital  stock  depends  on the share  of savings  in the risky 
asset  snd on the total amount  of  savings.  The share  of savings  in  bonds  is 
dictated  by the requirement  that the government  bonds  be willingly  held as 






+ 32t+P  (37) 
From  equations (28) and (29) the total stock  of government  debt depends  upon 
the aggregation  of the two countries  government  budget  constraints: 





-  (T1 + T2),  (38) 
where 
St  B 
+ 52t  This equation  is one of a two equation  system.  The 
other is found  by substitution  from the savings  conditions  equation (35) to 30 
derive 
K1  [$/(l+$)]{NlWl(K) 
+ N2W2(K) 










T1  +  02t 
- 
T2} 
which is the second  nonlinear  difference  equation  in  the aggregate  system. 
The stocks  of  capital  and bonds, K+1 and 5t+l' 
evolve as functions  of K  and 
with the exogenous  government  spending  and taxation  policies  and the 
stochastic  population  and productivity  shocks  as driving  processes.  In 
equations  (38) and (39) there  is explicit  dependence  of the wage rates  and 
the interest  rate on government  bonds on the outstanding  stock  of  capital, 
while their  dependence  on the population  and productivity  shocks  is left 
implicit. 
Linearization  and Stochastic  Trends 
When populations  grow and technological  change  is nonstationsry,  there  is 
no unconditional  mean value  or stochastic  steady  state  to the system  of 
equations  (38) and (39).  If common  trends  are removed,  as in King,  Plosser 
and Rebelo (1987), by deflating  the variables  by an appropriate  permsnent 
component,  s stochastic  steady  state  in  the deflated  variables  exists. 
Population  is assumed  to be driven  by a common  stochastic  trend, Nt  such 
that n.  — (N.  /N  ), i — 1,  2,  is  stationary.  If  one country  is not to 
it  it  t 
dominate  the other  country  eventually,  the permanent  component  in labor 
augmenting  technological  change,  also must  be the same.  The variables 
— (r./r) i — 1,  2, are therefore  stationary.  If there  is to be a 
stochastic  steady  state,  the exogenous  government  spending  and taxation 
policies  must also share  the permanent  components  of population  growth  and 
technological  change  such that  —  (G/Nr) 
and t 
—  i — 1, 
2,  are stationary. 31 
In the presence  of population  growth  and technological  change  the 
endogenous  variables  and  must also be allowed  to grow.  The permanent 
efficiency  units  of  labor,  are the source  of all growth.  The gross 
rate of change in this variable is 5t+l  (N÷1I'÷1)/(Nr)  To discuss  a 
stationary  representation,  let x  (/NF) for X  K, 
or for the 
individual  country  capital  stocks or bonds.  Let x denote the unconditional 
mean or stochastic  steady  state of x.  If  is defined  to be the percentage 
deviation  of x  from  its unconditional  value,  ln(X) 
— ln(F) + ln(N)  + 
in(x)  +  The series  is a stationary  stochastic  process  with 
unconditional  mean equal  to  zero.  The transformed  dynamic  system  is obtained 
by dividing  equations  (38) and  (39)  by NF: 
k151 










-  t1 
+  - 
t2t} 
b161 
—  + 
rb(kC) 
-  Pb 
+  -  +  - t2} 
(41) 
where the rate  of return  on bonds  need not be deflated  and the wage rates  are 
w.  — 
Consider  the dependence  of  on  the exogenous  variables.  The government 
bonds  promise  an uncontingent  rate of interest  rb  E1(r) 
.  The  expected 
value  of  the rate  of return  on capital  depends upon the expected  rates  of 
population  growth  and of technological  change  in period  t as well as on the 
capital stock  at time  t, which is in  the time  t-l information  set.  The 
percentage  deviation  of rb  from its steady  state  is 
rb 
— (1/2)E1{;l 
+  2t 
+ (1  - 
a)[n1 
+ 1lt + n2  + 
;2t]} 
-  (42) 
A larger  capital  stock  lowers  the marginal  product of  capital  and lowers 
the interest  rate on competing  assets.  Expectations  of higher  than average 32 
productivity  of either  type  in either  country  or of higher than  average 
population  in either  country  increase  the expected  rate of return  to capital 
and increase  the real interest  rate on government  bonds. 
The  state of the ayatem  is defined  to be the values  of the capital  stock 
and the government  bonds as well as the values  of the government  spending  and 
taxation  policiea.  In addition,  the anticipated  and unanticipated  values  of 
the two types  of productivity  shocks  and the population  growth  rates of the 
two countries,  relative  to the time t-l information  set, enter the state. 
Therefore,  the deviation  of the capital stock  from its steady  state value can 
be written  as a linear  function,  Fk 
of  these variables: 
k+1 
— 
Fk[5t+l  u.n, u;.. un. 
(43) 
Et1(Y.)  E1(n.) 
i — 1,  2J 
where  ux  denotes  the innovation  in x  relative  to time t-l.  The responses 
of  the aggregate  capital  stock  as a function  of  these  state  variables  is 
presented  in  Table  I. 
The deviation  of the aggregate  stock of bonds from its steady  state  can be 
written  as a linear  function,  Fb: 
b1 
— 
Fb[5t+l  E1(n.) 
(44) 
and the values  of the coefficients  are given  in  Table  2.  The aggregate 
government  bond stock  does not depend  on the unanticipated  productivity 
shocks or population  growth  rates because  the tax system  is not dependent  on 
current  income. 
Once  the aggregate  capital  stock  is determined,  the country  specific 
capital  stocks  are found to be 
it 
—  °i°lt 
+  i — 1,  2,  (45) Table  1 
Coefficients  in k+i  Equation 
State  Variable  Effect  on  k  t+l 
'tkO  -l 
k  — (/l+$)  (a/ky)  [w1n1+w2n2] 
+ (rb/ky) (1-a)  t  kl 







tlt  Itk5  (l/l+$)(t1/ky) 
Itk6  (l/l+$)(t2/k-y) 
($/l+$)(w1n1/ky) 
U2t  ItkS  (j3/l+$)(w2n2/k-y) 
ult  1tk9 
— 
'klO 
ufti  Itkll 
— 
uft  it  it  (2a)  2t  k12  k8 
- 
Itkly  11k7 
-  (l/2)(rb/k-y) 
rk14  Itks 
-  (l/2)(rb/ky) 
ITk9 




-  (l/2)(l-a)(rb/ky) 
Ei(fti)  'Tkl7  1Tkll 
-  (l/2)(l-a)(rb/k-y) 
Itkls  Itkl2 
-  (l/2)(l-a)(rb/ky) Table  2 
Coefficients  in b÷i Equation 
State  Variable  Effect  on 
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a1/(1  + a1),  and the deviation  from  the 
steady  state  of the parameter  determining  the share  of capital  allocated 
across  countries  is 
— [1/C 






Linearization  of the individual  government  budget  constraints  providea  the 




6t+1 + [U + rb 
- p)/S[b. + (g./8bJg 
+ 
(47) 
-  (t./5b)t. 
+ (rb/S)rb 
i — 1,  2. 
Given  these  solutions,  international  capital  flows  can be determined. 
Eouilibrium  International  Caoital  Flows 
The absolute  level of  the current  account of country  one  is given  in 
equation (31).  It  depends  implicitly  on savings  in  the  two countriea  and on 
the evolution  of government  bonds.  Individual  savings behavior is given  in 
equation  (34).  Consequently,  deflating  equation (31) by NtFt and rearranging 
terms  gives  the deflated  current account  as 
ca1 
— [b21 
-  (1 
- 
t)bit÷i]8t+1 
-  [1b2 
-  (1 
- $1)b1] 
(48) 
where  [n1sl/(n1s1 
+ n2s2)] which is the share  of country  one 
saving  in world  saving.  If in  the stochastic  steady  state, this share  times 
the government  bond stock  of country  two is larger than the share of savings 
in country  two times the country  one bond stock,  [b2 
-  (1 
-  )b1[ 
> 0, 
either because the size of  the country  one bond stock is smaller,  or because 
its government  sector  is smaller,  the current  account  of country  one is in 
surplus.  As long as this difference  is not zero,  it makes  sense  to discuss  a 34 
log-linearization  of the current  account. 
Expreaaing  the deflated  current  account  in percentage  deviations  from the 
steady  state  gives  a quasi-reduced  form  expression 
cs1  cO8t+l 
+ 
tci[6t 
-  t-l] 
+ 
2[8b2+1 
-  + 




a  -  (1 
-  )b1]/ca1  >  xci. 
— (b/ca1) 
>  b2/ca.  > 
O  a -  [(1 
-  )b1]/ca1  C 0, and the signs of the 
lrc  coefficients  are 
premised  on 
cs1 
> 0.  If country  one  is in  surplus  in  the steady  state,  it 
experiences  a transitory  current  account  surplus whenever there  is a 
transitorily  high growth  rate of either  stochastic  trend.  Also,  things  that 
increase  the share  of country  one savings  in  world savings  increase  the 
current  account  surplus  of country  one.  Finally,  increases  in the resort  of 
country  two's  government t  financing  deficits  with  bonds lead to current 
account  surpluses  for country  one, and symmerricslly,  increases  in the resort 
of country  one's  government  to financing  deficits  with government  bonds  lead 
to current  account  deficits  of country  one. 
Expressing  the current  account  as a true  reduced  form requires  an 
expression  for the percentage  deviation  from  the steady  state  of the share  of 
savings  of country  one  in  world saving.  Since  the expression  is long,  the 
coefficients  are presented  in  Table  3.  Transitory  increases  in working  age 
population  or the productivity  of country  one improve  the current  account 
while the converse  is true of  changes  in these variables  for country  two. 
Tax increases  in country  one cause  a decrease  in the savings  rate of the 
private  sector,  but they decrease  the resort  of the government  sector  to bond 
finance  which improves  the current  account. 
Complementary  Empirical  Investisations 
The previous two sections  develop  alternative  rational  expectations  models Table  3 
Coefficients  in  Equation 
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that are explicitly  stochastic.  As such,  they are potentially  directly 
testable.  Unfortunately,  they  are not sufficiently  well formulated  that  I 
think  they deserve  to be examined  empirically.  Rather  than formally  test and 
reject  the models,  I examine  some of their implications  empirically  in  this 
section.  I view the theory  and empirical  sections  of. this paper  as 
complementary  avenues  of investigation  that are leading toward  a well 
designed  theory  that  will eventually  not be rejected  by the data. 
An Uodate  of Evans  (1986) 
One of the most striking  differences  across  the two models is the 
implication  that  government  budget  deficits  do not affect  real allocations 
and relative  prices  such  as the real exchange  rate in the Ricardian  model 
whereas they  do affect  the consumption  and savings  decisions  in the 
overlapping  generations  model.  Budget  deficits  also figure  prominently  in 
the explanation  of the movement  in real exchange  rates  in the popular  press, 
in neo-Keynesian  frameworks,  and in  the writings  of Feldstein  (1986).  Budget 
deficits  are thought  to appreciate  the dollar in  nominal  and real terms 
leading  to an overvalued  currency  and a current  account  deficit. 
One way to investigate  the influence  of budget  deficits  on the economy  is 
to adopt  the reduced  form  methodology  of Plosser  (1982).  The  idea is to 
assume that one knows the return  generating  process  for an asset  or an 
exchange  rate from  a rational  expectations  model.  This supplies  an 
observable  unexpected  component  to the return  or the change  in the exchange 
rate.  The unexpected  change  in  the exchange  rate  is then  regressed  on 
innovations  in government  policy  variables  and other  exogenous  variables  that 
are presumed to be exogenous  and that  are generated  from a  vector 
autoregression  (VAR).  One must assume  that the VAR is sufficiently  well 
specified  that the true structure  of  the economy  is captured  by the 36 
regressions.  If it is, the results  of Psgan  (1984) indicste  thst  the two- 
step  procedure  produces  consistent  and asymptotically  efficient  estimators  of 
the influence  of  the policy  variables  on the returns.  If  the VAR is 
misspecified,  as it will be if  the agents of the economy have more 
information  than is attributed  to them  by the econometrician,  the approach  is 
suspect  and nay be bankrupt  in  the sense  that the parameter  estimates  will be 
inconsistent. 
Evans (1986) used this approach  in an investigation  of exchange  rates 
using  quarterly  data for the period  1973:11  to 1984:111.  Stockman (1986),  in 
his comment on Feldstein  (1986), cites  Evans  (1986) as providing  evidence  in 
opposition  to the conclusions  of Feldstein  (1986) that  budget  deficits  of the 
U.S.  appreciate  the dollar.  Stockman  (1986, p.L+O4)  states: 
When changes  in real go'ernment  spending  and the deficit  are 
simultaneously  included  in an equation  for the exchange  rate, his 
(Evans's)  estimates  show  a sizable  and statistically  significant  effect  of 
higher  government  spending,  leading  to real  appreciation  (of the dollar), 
and a coefficient  on the budget  deficit  that is oooosite  in sign  from 
Feldatein's  estimates  and sometimes  statistically  significant.  Evans's 
results  show  a larger U.S.  deficit,  given  real government  spending, 
leading  to a dollar  depreciation.  When Evans  included  foreign  variables 
in his equations,  he found that greater  foreign  government  spending  leads 
to dollar  depreciation  and greater  foreign  deficits  lead  to dollar 
appreciation,  with the estimated  effects  of  U.S.  government  spending  and 
deficits  remaining  essentially  unchanged. 
Stockman  (1986) recognized  that  additional  data  might be very useful  in the 
debate  about  the effects  of deficits  on  the dollar,  since  the dollar 
depreciated  by a substantial  amount  from its peak in February  1985.  Because 37 
Evans's  evidence  has figured prominently  in  the debate  on the determinants  of 
the dollar  with its attendant  influence  on the balance  of  payments,  I updated 
his analysis  with available  data. 
The results  are presented  in Table 4.  The dependent  variable  is 
log(S1/F) 
with exchange  rates  measured  as the value of currency  i  in terms 
of the U.S.  dollar.  The exchange  rate data  were obtained  from the OECD  Main 
Economic  Indicators  and are end-of-quarter  rates  for the spot and the  three- 
month  forward  exchange  rates.  The currencies  are the Belgian  franc,  the 
British  pound,  the Canadian  dollar,  the Deutsche  mark,  the Dutch guilder,  the 
French  franc, and the Swiss  franc.  Since several  of these  currencies  are 
members  of the European  Monetary  System,  it is unlikely  that the results  are 
independent  information  across  all currencies. 
The motivation  for the ependent  variable  is the unbiasedness  hypothesis 
that links  forward  rates  to expected  future spot  exchange  rates  under  a 
presumption  of risk  neutrality.  Evidence  on the validity  of this 
specification  is presented  below.  Here I merely  note that  previous  research, 
surveyed  in Hodrick (1987), suggests  that the specification  is  questionable. 
Since  unanticipated  changes  in exchange  rates  are so large,  though,  it may be 
reasonable  to conclude  that nothing  particularly  critical  in  the 
interpretation  of  these  results hinges  on the failure  of  the unbiasedness 
hypothesis.  This is certainly  not true as a general  rule. 
The regressors  in Table  4 include a constant  and the residuals  from  a VAR 
that are the unanticipated  changes  in the logarithm  of real federal 
government  purchases,  UG;  in  the real federal government  deficit  relative  to 
trend,  UD, measured  by deflating  nominal  deficits  by the product  of trend 
real  GNP and the GNP deflator;  in the logarithm  of real balances,  UN, 
measured  as the Ml money  supply  for the last  month of  the quarter  divided  by Table 4 
Ordinary Least  Squares Update of  Equation  (50) 

















Deutsche  -0.002  0.047  0.123  1.133  -0.200  - .036 











British  -0.004  0.148  -1.108  0.446  1.480  - .039 











Canadian  -0.003  0.016  0.148  0.157  -0.411  -  056 











Belgian  0.003  0.164'  0.341  1.269  -0.125  - .019 











French  -0.003  0.196  0.689  0,635  2.071  - .046 











Dutch  -0.00001  0.099  0.256  1.072  0.733  - .042 











Swiss  0.0004  0.071  -0.030  0.966  1.389  - .059 











Note:  Tb  e standard  e rrors of  th  e  estimated  coefficients  are in parenthesis 
of significance of  the test of the  below  the coefficients.  The marginal level 
hypothesis  that the coefficient  is zero is reported below the standard errors. 38 
the GNP deflator;  and in the logarithm  of the GNP deflator,  UP.8  I  followed 
Evans  (1986)  and estimated  a fourth-order  VAR on seven variables  that 
included  a constant,  the four variables  described  above,  the discount  rate of 
the Federal  Reserve,  and the logarithms  of real GNP and the monetary base. 
The VAR was estimated  from 1962:11  to 1987:IV,  and the results  of Table  4 are 
for 1973:111  to 1987:IV  due to availability  of exchsnge  rate data. 
Before I discuss my extension  of Evans  (1986)  ,  I present  a typical 
equation  from  his Table 1 with the coefficients  and standard  errors  in 
parenthesis.  The currency  is the Deutsche  mark,  and the constant  is 
suppressed: 
log[SiFl(1)]  — -l.005U0  + 5.96UD  +  2.6OUM  +  7.99UP  +  £  (50) 
(0.320)  (1.55)  (1.18)  (2.59) 
R2 — 0.323;  S.E. — 0.0543;  OW. — 1.87 
Since  the exchange  rates  are U.S. dollars  per Deutsche  mark,  a depreciation 
(appreciation)  of the dollar  is a positive (negative)  movement  in the 
dependent  variable.  Hence, Evans found  that an increase  in federal 
government  spending  causes a statistically  significant  appreciation  of the 
dollar  relative  to the mark,  while  increases  in federal budget  deficits, 
which  are measured  positively,  cause  a statistically  significant  depreciatior 
of the dollar,  as do unanticipated  increases  in  U.S.  real  balances  and in the 
U.S. price level.  One possible  explanation  of the coefficient  on budget 
deficits  is that they are substantially  endogenous  and are merely reflecting 
bad news about  the performance  of the U.S.  real  economy,  which  depreciates 
the dollar.  Another explanation  is that budget  deficits  are eventually 
financed  by printing  of  money,  and an increase  in the budget  deficit  creates 
expected  inflation  which depreciates  the dollar.  Evans  (1986) examined 
cyclically  adjusted  budget  deficits  and found  similar  effects  which tends  to 39 
support  the latter  interpretation. 
The results  in  Table  4 indicate  that  extension  of the sample  period to 
l987:IV  completely  eliminates  the statistical  significance  of the variables. 
The magnitudes  of the coefficients  are reduced  and are often  of the opposite 
sign of Evans's  estimates.  The standard  errors  of  the coefficients  have 
increased  dramatically  which eliminates  the statistical  significance  of the 
variables.  In  particular,  the effects  of the government  purchases  and 
deficit  variables  are now no longer  significantly  different  from zero.  The 
reduction  in  the explanatory  power  of the variables  in  the larger  sample is 
now reflected  in negative  adjusted  R2's. 
I have not attempted  to determine  why the results deteriorate  in the 
longer  sample,  but I have attempted  to replicate  Evans's  results over  his 
sample  period  with my versIons of  the variables.  My results  are not as 
strong  as Evans's  even  over his sample  period.  Apparently,  Evans's 
measurements  of  the GNP deflator  as the last  month  of the quarter  is one 
source  of difference  between  the two estimations.  The results also appear  to 
be somewhat  sensitive  to the starting  date. 
A complete  explanation  for the differences  across  periods would  require 
more space  than  can be used here,  but one thing  stands  out.  If the VAR 
methodology  were correct,  in  the sense  of capturing  the exogenous  forces  of 
the economy,  and there were no changes  in  regimes,  the results  would  not be 
so dependent  on the sample.  Hence,  the dependence  I find  must indicate  that 
the VAR methodology  is very suspect  and cannot  be used to interpret  causal 
influences  on exchange  rates  and capital  flows. 
In the next section  I discuss  additional  evidence  that suggests  the 
importance  of risk  aversion  in developing  international  financial  models  to 
guide our interactions  with the data. 40 
International  Caoitaj.  Market  Equilibrium 
Correct  analysis  of current  accounts  and international  capital  flows  an 
appropriate  description  of equilibrium  expected  returns  in international 
capital markets.  Frenkel  (1985) and Krugman  (1986,  1988)  have  used an 
argument,  premised  on the appropriateness  of risk  neutrality,  to address  the 
issue  of the sustainebility  exchange  rates.  Unsustainable  rates  are thought 
to be pert of a "bubble"  or possibly  en irrationality  in the foreign  exchange 
market.9 
A basic  building  block of  the sustainebility  explorations  is the 
assumption  that the expected  rate of change  in  the real exchange  rate is the 
reel interest  differential  across  countries.  The level  of the real exchange 
rate is deemed to be wrong  or unsustainable  if this calculated  rate of change 
implies  too much accumulation  of external  debt over the future.  The rate at 
which the U.S.  accumulates  external  debt is modeled in a simplistic  fashion 
similar  to equation (1), but with constant  domestic  and foreign  growth  rates. 
I find this approach  wrong for at least  two reasons. 
First,  it is inappropriate  to hold other things  constant.  Growth  rates of 
countries  ought to be allowed  to differ  over time,  and there  are other 
determinants  of the current  account  other  than  the current  real exchange 
rate.  Secondly,  the assumption  of risk  neutrality  is not well supported  by 
10  the available  evidence.  In  Hodrick  (1987)  I discuss  a considerable  body of 
evidence  that indicates  the inappropriateness  of an assumption  of risk 
neutrality.  In this section  I present  some  new results  that  are 
representative  of the previous  findings of myself  and others. 
ImDlications  of Risk-Neutrality 
Let S 
denote the spot exchange  rate of  dollars  per foreign  currency,  and 
let F  be the forward  price  at which one can contract  at time t for purchase 41 
of foreign  currency  in one period.  The nominal  dollar  profit from  a long 
position in  the forward  foreign  currency  market  is 5t+l 
- Ft).  If  is the 
purchssing  power of a dollar,  the real  value  of the profit  is 5t+l 
- 
F)ir÷i. 
Since  there is no opportunity  cost to making  the forward  contract, 
risk  neutral  preferences  imply  that the expected  value of the real  profit  on 
the forward  contract  is zero, 
-  F  )ir  —  0.  (51) 
The standard  way that  a hypothesis  such  as (51)  is tested  is to regress 
realizations  of the real  profit  at time t+l on information  in the time t 
information  set.11  Since the stationarity  of the regressors  is a factor  in 
the derivation  of the asymptotic  distribution  theory  of the estimators,  I 
first  divided  the real  profit at time t+l by the product of the exchange  rate 
and the purchasing  power  of the dollar at time t.  The specification  of  the 
regression  allows  a small number  of different  instruments  across  currencies: 
ii  r  i1  1i  i1  - 
Ftjirt+1  [Ft 
-  [ 
- Fjir  —. +.  .  +fi.  .  +c  (52)  1  i0  tl  1  1  t+l  Sir  S  S  ir  tt  t  t-lt-l 
where +l 
is the rational  expectations  error term,  and the null  hypothesis 
of risk  neutrality  is  — 0,  j — 0,  1,  2,  for each currency  i. 
An alternative  derivation  of the deflation  in equation (52) recognizes 
that its left-hand  side,  when  multiplied  by one plus the foreign  nominal 
interest  rate,  is the difference  in two real rates  of return.  Investing  a 
dollar  at time t is a sacrifice  of ic goods.  The one dollar  purchases 
units  of foreign  currency.  Each  unit of foreign  currency  can be invested  to 
give one plus the foreign  interest  rate in foreign  currency  at time t+l.  If 
the investment  is uncovered,  the agent  sells  the accumulated  foreign currency 
for dollars  in the future  spot  market  at 5t+l' while if the investment  is 42 
covered  to remove  the uncertainty  of repatriation  at a random  exchange  rate, 
the agent  contracts  to sell the interest plus principal  on the foreign 
currency at Ft.  In either  case  the dollar  proceeds  of the investment  are 
valued  at c÷l in  terms  of real goods.  If agents  are risk neutral,  the 
expected  real rate of return  on  all investments  should  be equal,  and the 
left-hand  aide of equation  (52) should  have  expected  value of  zero. 
The motivation  for the instruments  on the right-hand  aide  of equation  (52) 
is the following.  As Fama (1984) noted,  the forward  premium,  (F 
-  S)/St 
can be defined  to be the market's  assessment  of  the expected  rate of 
depreciation  of the home currency  plus an adjusted  risk  premium.  Therefore, 
it should  be a useful  instrument  if risk is actually  present.  If expected 
real returns  are not the same across  assets,  the lagged  dependent  variable 
should  capture  aerial  correlation  in the difference  of the two returns  if it 
is present. 
Teats of equation (52) were conducted  using  the same  OECD data  on exchange 
rates  described  above.  I examined  the hypotheaia  from  two perspectives:  a 
U.S.  investor  using  U.S.  dollar  per foreign currency  exchange  rates  and a 
U.K. investor  using  British  pound  per foreign  currency  exchange  rates.  The 
purchasing  powers  of monies  were measured  as the reciprocals  of the U.S. 
National Income and Product Accounts  deflator  of consumer  nondurablea  plus 
services  and the U.K.  deflator  for nondureblea. 
I examined  two types  of estimation  of the system  of equations.  In the 
first  I constrained  the three  parameters  of each  equation to be the same 
across  the aeven  equations  and estimated  the system  with Hansen's (1982) 
Generalized  Method  of Momenta (GMM) without imposing  the auxiliary  aaaumption 
of conditional  homoacedasticity.  I employed  three  orthogonality  conditions 
for each  currency  requiring  that  the expectation  error  be orthogonal  to the 43 
three  right-hand  side  variables. 
For the U.S.  dollar  system,  the constrained  value  of  is -1.722 with a 
standard  deviation  of  0.793;  the constrained  value of  is -0.458 with a 
standard  deviation  of  0.122,  and the constrained  value of  is 0.140  with a 
standard  deviation  of  0.061.  The value  of the chi-square  statistic  with 
three  degrees  of freedom  that tests  the hypothesis  that the three 
coefficients  are zero is 16.483, which  corresponds  to a marginal  level  of 
significance  of .0009.  This is strong  evidence  that the expected  real 
returns  to speculation  by a U.S.  investor  in the forward  foreign  exchange 
market are not constant.  The value of  the chi-square  statistic  with eighteen 
degrees  of freedom  that tests  the hypothesis  that the constraints  on the 
coefficients  across  equations  are inappropriate  is  15.322,  which  corresponds 
to a  marginal level  of  sigt\ificance of .640. 
For the  U.K. pound system  the constrained  value of  is  1.799  with a 
standard  deviation  of 1.632;  the constrained  value  of l 
is -0.325 with a 
standard  deviation  of  0.107,  and the constrained  value of  is 0.157 ;ith s 
standard  deviation  of 0.056.  The value  of  the chi-square  statistic  with 
three  degrees  of freedom  that tests  the hypothesis  that the three 
coefficients  are zero  is 15.517, which  corresponds  to a marginal  level  of 
significance  smaller  than .001.  The chi-square  statistic  with eighteen 
degrees  of freedom  that tests  the hypothesis  that  the constraints  on  the 
coefficients  are inappropriate  has a value of 19.319  which corresponds  to a 
marginal  level  of significance  of .372. 
The other system  estimation  that I performed  was  seemingly  unrelated 
regression  under the auxiliary  assumption  of  homoscedasticity.  The results 
of this estimation  for the U.S.  dollar system  are presented  in Table 5  and 
for the U.K.  pound  system  in Table  6.  The test of  the hypothesis  that the Table  5 














Deutsche  4.015  -1.065  0.008  .029  9.795  9.805 






.007  .020 
British  -0.435  -0.565  0.196  .054  4.790  4.802 
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Canadian  -2.091  -1.469  -0.063  .061  3.436  4.207 






.179  .240 
Belgian  1.659  -0.878  0.032  .020  8.987  9.624 






.011  .022 
French  -0.541  -0.796  0.122  .077  5.221  5.221 






.073  .156 
Dutch  3.606  -1.137  0.050  .088  15.114  15.183 






.001.  .002 
Swiss  14.171  -2.309  -0.153  .062  10.461  10.681 






.005  .014 
Note:  The system of equations was estimated by seemingly  unrelated  regression. 
See also Table  4. 44 
expected  real  returns  are zero in this case is a chi-square  statistic  with 
twenty-one  degrees  of freedom.  For the U.S.  dollar  system,  the value  of 
52.267  corresponds  to a marginal level of significance  of .0002, which is 
quite  strong  evidence  against  the null  hypothesis.  For the U.K.  pound 
system,  the value of 77.816  corresponds  to a marginal level  of significance 
of .0000001,  which is also exceedingly  strong  evidence against  the null 
hypothesis. 
I also constrained  the systems  to three  coefficients  as above.  For the 
U.S.  dollar  system,  the constrained  value  of  is -1.329  with a standard 
deviation  of 1.145;  the constrained  value of  is -0.536  with a standard 
deviation  of 0.117,  and the constrained  value of 2  is 0.075  with a standard 
deviation  of 0.049.  The value  of the chi-square  statistic  with three  degrees 
of freedom  that tests the ciypothesis that the three  coefficients  are zero is 
28.411,  which corresponds  to a marginal  level  of significance  smaller than 
.000001.  The chi-square  statistic  with eighteen  degrees of freedom  that 
tests  the hypothesis  that the constraints  on the coefficients  are 
inappropriate  has a value of  19.649,  which  corresponds  to a marginal  level of 
significance  of .353.  For the U.K. pound system,  the constrained  value of 
is 2.739 with a standard  deviation  of 2.034;  the constrained  value of 'l is  - 
0.641  with a standard  deviation  of  0.129,  and the constrained  value of $7 is 
0.065  with a standard  deviation  of 0.049.  The value of the chi-square 
statistic  with three  degrees  of freedom  that tests  the hypothesis  that the 
three  coefficients  are zero is 31.937, which corresponds  to a marginal level 
of significance  smaller than .000001.  The chi-square  statistic  with eighteen 
degrees  of freedom that tests  the hypothesis  that the constraints  on the 
coefficients  are inappropriate  has a value  of 35.211,  which corresponds  to a 
marginal level  of significance  of .009. Table 6 
System Estimation  of Equation  (52) for U.K. Exchange  Rates 













Deutsche  6.630  -1.273  -0.060  .098  34.319  34.432 






.000  .000 
U.S.  2.081  -0.319  0.201  .091  5.945  6.807 






.051  .078 
Canadian  1.078  -0.753  0.243  .145  11.810  12.026 






.003  .007 
Belgian  3.159  -0.79  -0.015  .075  13.453  14.854 






.001  .002 
French  0.774  -1.297  -0.055  .127  15.757  15.815 






.000  .001 
Dutch  5.248  -1.142  0.003  .110  27.641  27.933 






.000  .000 
Swiss  14.021  -1.819  -0.142  .112  15.366  15.838 






.000  .001 
Note:  The system of equations  was  estimated by seemingly  unrelated 
regression.  The  data are U.K. pounds per foreign currency.  See also 
Table 4. 4,5 
Should  the above analysis  be taken  as evidence  against risk neutral asset 
pricing for U.S.  and U.K.  based investors,  or is there  reason  to think that 
the time series  properties  of the data are not consistent  with the ergodicity 
assumption  implicit  in the derivation  of the test statistics?  These are 
questions  that  have been answered  differently  by different  researchers,  and I 
refer the interested  reader  to Hodrick (1987) for a survey  of the opinions. 
Risk-Averse  Models 
If risk neutrality  is not a correct  measure of international  capital 
market equilibrium,  what is?  One natural direction  to proceed is to examine 
models of risk averse  behavior are capable of reconciling  the pattern of time 
variation in expected  returns.  Although there  has been considerable 
investigation  of intertemporal  asset  pricing equations  derived from 
representative  agent Euler'equations  since  the publication  of Hansen  and 
Singleton (1982)  there is not as yet a consensus  on the appropriate 
intertemporal  asset  pricing  model.  Here I merely  inquire how well two simple 
versions work.  The first  model is in the spirit  of the original  analysis of 
Hansen  and Singleton (1982).  The second  is related to the Ricardian  model 
derived  above. 
If agents are averse  to risk,  expected  returns depend  on nature of the 
risk-aversion  and the opportunities  that  they have for trading  assets.  In 
simple  intertemporal  asset  pricing  models,  such as Hansen and Singleton 
(1982),  the portfolio  decisions  require equality  between the marginal  utility 
foregone  when the asset  is purchased  and the expected  discounted  marginal 
utility of the payoff on the asset.  The early empirical  tests  of the 
intertemporal  asset  pricing used the cost of the asset in real terms  times 
the marginal utility of consumption  goods  as the opportunity  cost of the 
investment,  and the tests  used the real  payoff on the asset times  the 46 
marginal utility of consumption  in the future  as the realization  of the 
marginal gain  on the  investment. 
With this timing  the difference  between  the uncovered  and covered foreign 
money market investments  is given  by 
E  -F]rt+lU'(Ct±l)  0  (53)  t 
S1rU'(C) 
where U'(C) is the marginal  utility of consumption  at time t.  If marginal 
utility is parameterized  by ca, and  consumption  is taken to be the 
consumption  of nondurables  plus services  per household  for  the U.S.  investor 
and the consumption  of nondurables  for the U.K.  inveator,  the Euler equations 
(53) can be estimated  for the seven  currencies.  This specification  was 
tested  with monthly data for the U.S.  dollar  over the  sample 1973:3 to 1983:7 
by Mark (1985). 
I estimated the two seven  equation systems  for the U.S.  data and the U.K. 
data separately.  Each system  contains  one free parameter,  a, and I  used the 
same set of three  instruments  per equation  as above.  For the U.S.  data the 
estimated  a is 60.918 with a standard  error  of 22.208.  Although thia 
estimate seems  wildly  high,  in the sense that it implies  extremely  risk 
averse  behavior, and consequently  probably ought  to be taken  as evidence 
against the specification  of the model,  the chi-square  statistic  that tests 
the twenty  overidentifying  restrictions  has a value of 22.656,  which 
corresponds  to a  marginal level of significance  of .329.  Hence,  while the 
instrumental  variablea  were powerful enough  to provide  a strong  rejection  of 
the risk-neutrality  hypothesis,  the orthogonality  conditions  implied  by the 
risk averse  model  are not rejected  by the data.  Similar  results  with monthly 
data are reported  by Mark (1985).  He found very high estimates  of a, and the 47 
overidentifying  restrictions  of the model  did not indicate  rejection of the 
specification. 
For the U.K. data,  the estimated  a is 2.1513  with a standard  error of 
3.0488.  The chi-square  statistic  that  tests the twenty  overidentifying 
restrictions  has a  value of 24.593,  which corresponds  to a  marginal level of 
significance  of .217.  The U.K.  data  do not produce a coefficient  of relative 
risk aversion  that is significantly  different  from  zero,  but the very atrong 
evidence  against  the risk neutral  model also is not present when consumption 
is allowed to  vary. 
One reason the above specifications  of the intertemporal  asset pricing 
model  might be incorrect  is that the timing  of the marginal  utility of 
oomsumption  is incorrect.  In cash-in-advance  models such  as the one above, 
the dollar  proceeds  from an investment  can only be used in the next available 
goods  market,  and the value of the return  in terms  of goods  is not certain. 
If this alternative  timing is followed,  the specification  of the Euler 
equation  becomes 
[51  -  Fhllr  U'(C  )  L t+1  tj t÷2  t+2  — 0 
t 
S1rU'(C) 
I estimated  equation  (54) for the same seven  currencies  and with the same 
set of instrument  as employed  in equation (53)12  The results for both 
currencies  are similar  in that the estimated  a for the U.S.  system is 53.652 
with a standard error  of  16.880,  and the chi-square  statistic  with 20 degrees 
of freedom  is 21.656, which corresponds  to a marginal  level  of significance 
of .359.  For the U.K. system  the results  are an estimate  of a of 3.037  with 
a standard error  of 2.876,  and a chi-square  statistic  of 24.463,  which 
corresponds  to a marginal  level of significance  of .222. 48 
Alternative  Interpretations 
One puzzling aspect  of the above  regression  analysis  is the persistent 
statistically  significant  negative  coefficient  on the forward  premiums.  This 
suggests that  high  values of the forward  premium (high  forward  prices of 
foreign  currencies  in term  of dollars relative  to spot  prices) are associstec 
with less depreciation  of the dollar  relative  to the foreign currency than is 
predicted  by the forward  premium.  Probably,  the smaller  depreciation  is 
actually  an appreciation  of the dollar  relative  to foreign  currencies. 
A  potential  explanation  of this phenomenon  is that  the data are simply  not 
reflecting  all of the possible events  that concern  agents  when they are 
setting  asset  prices.  Fama (1984) credits  Mussa for advancing  the following 
hypothesis  explaining  why the sample statistics  might not be consistent  with 
the true  underlying  probability  distributiona  that  agents  assess rationally. 
Since the  forward  preaium  is directly  related to the nominal interest 
differential  across  countries  from covered interest  rate parity,  a large 
positive  value of the forward premium  indicates  that the U.S.  nominal 
interest  rate is high relative  to the foreign nominal interest  rate.  Mussa 
suggested  that  periods of high expected  inflation  in either country  may also 
be periods of highly  skewed  distributions  of possible inflation  rates.  One 
reason  would be because  the privete sector  is worried that the public sector 
may lose control  of the economy.  This skewed  distribution  of possible 
inflation  rates raises  the expected  rate of inflation,  which  would raise  thai 
country's  nominal interest  rate,  and increase  the absolute  value of the 
forward  premium.  If the sample  size is insufficiently  large,  the 
realizations  of high inflation  and large  depreciations  of currencies  that 
concern the private sector  may be occurring  with less frequency  in the actua] 
data than is necessary to reconcile  the use of asymptotic  statistics.  Hence, 49 
high nominal interest  rates  appear in a small sample  to be asaociated  with 
high ex post real interest  rates,  and large values of the forward  premium are 
associated  with appreciations  of the dollar  while large  discounta  on forward 
foreign currencies  are associated  ex post  with depreciations  of the dollar. 
Bates (1987) examines  the evidence  from option  prices on Deutache mark 
futures,  which provide additional  information  about the subjective 
distributions  of future  exchange  rates implicit  in market  pricea.  He finds a 
lack of symmetry in  the ex ante distribution  of the dollar-OH  rate.  Perhaps 
use of additional  data such as option  prices  will allow  a better 
understanding  of the phenomenon  in future  work. 
Additional  data in the form of surveys  of expected  future  spot rates  have 
also  been employed  by Frankel and Froot  (1987).  Their findings  with 
relatively  short sample peiods indicate  that rationality  of the survey data 
can  be rejected. 
One possible explanation  of the above  empirical  work is that the market is 
assessing  more possible  events  than  have occurred  during  the sample  period. 
If this is the case,  econometric  analysis  of the determination  of 
international  capital  flows  and real exchange  rates is probably  also suspect. 
Conclusions 
In this paper I discuss alternative  reasons for the current  large  U.S. 
capital flows and attempt  to provide some  perspectives  that can guide  future 
modeling  of these issues.  One major findings  is that movements  of U.S.  real 
income  growth relative  to that  of the rest of the world and movements in the 
U.S.  real exchange rate  do a reasonable  job of "explaining"  the U.S.  current 
account,  when allowance  is made for lags in responses.  Given this,  it seemed 
reasonable  to develop  models  of the current account  as a rational equilibrium 
response  of competitive  agents  to the stochastic  forcing  processes of their 50 
economies. 
I examined two sggregative  dynamic  models  that have strong  microeconomic 
foundations. Both models  explicitly  develop  the savings and investment 
decisions  of the private  sector,  and both consider rudimentary  government 
sectors.  Neither model is,  at this  point,  sufficiently  well posed to be 
consistent  with the  data.  Solution  of the Ricardian  model required  a number 
of strong  assumptions  such as serially  uncorrelated  driving  processes,  and 
separability  of the utility  function.  Solution  of the overlapping 
generations  model required that there  is one good in the world economy,  that 
the capital stock  can be allocated  costlesaly  across  countries  after the 
realization  of productivity,  that the government  bonds of the two countries 
are perfect  substitutes,  and that there  is no money.  Explicit  solution for 
the flow of capital  across'countries  also required  a linearization  which 
imposed  an assumption  of risk  neutrality.  Both models allowed  for perfect 
capital  mobility across  countries  with the Ricardian  model impoaing  a 
perfectly  pooled equilibrium.  Little  work has been done on alternatives  to 
this idea in which the reasons why countriea  do not accumulate  large claims 
on each other  are endogenous)3 
One different  prediction  of the two models involves  the role of government 
budget deficits.  Both  models  predict that  movements in productivity  across 
countries  and in the sizes of the government  sectors  affect the real 
equilibrium,  but the Ricardian  model  predicts that the financing  of the 
government  sector  does  not matter  as long  as the taxation  is 
nondiatortionary. 
This difference  in predictions  was then examined  empirically. The highly 
significant  empirical  analysis in  Evans  (1986)  that was interpreted  as 
evidence  that U.S. budget deficits  do not appreciate  the dollar is not 51 
supported  with an additional  two and a half years  of data.  The specification 
deteriorates  very badly.  While it is certainly  possible that inference  from 
the VAR approach  is worthwhile,  one suspects  that agents  have additional 
sources of information  about future  deficits  not captured  by the regressions. 
Developing  a model of the alternative  way that agents  forecast  is necessary 
before scientific  inquiry  can proceed. 
I next explored  two simple  models  of international  capital  market 
equilibrium. The results of these  risk  premium studies have several 
alternative  interpretations. One may be that international  capital  markets 
function  poorly  and allow  exchange rates  to be excessively  volatile.  Another 
is that risk  aversion is an important  attribute  of our economic  environment 
that interacts  with changes  in the environment  to produce substantial  changes 
in required  expected  returns and asset prices.14 A  third is that the 
reported statistics  are not appropriate  because agents  are assigning 
probabilities  to events that  have not occurred  with sufficient  frequency. 
The sample  statistics  are poor measures  of the subjective  probability 
distributions  implicit in  the calculations  that  lead to the decisions of 
agents.  If this is the case,  such  problems  will infect  any analysis  of 
exchange  rates,  and any regreasions  purporting  to explain  capital  flows will 
no doubt  be misspecified. 
Understanding  capital flows  across  countries  requires  an understanding  of 
the savings  and investment  decisions  of economic  agents and of the sources of 
business cycles  and of economic  growth.  Equilibrium  models  of theses  dynamic 
aspects of the economy  are still  being developed.  Understanding  capital 
flows  also requires  an understanding  of the determination  of exchange  rates 
and other  asset prices,  which requires  knowledge of expectations  formation  of 
the private sector  and of the influence  of  the government  sector  on the 52 
economy.  The models of this  paper may prove  useful in the development  of 
future  economic  models  of these  phenomena. 
In the  introduction  I outlined  several  important  questions  that  have been 
posed  because of recent  U.S. current  account  deficits.  I now provide a 
simple  answer to the questions  based more on the style of model that I have 
developed  than  on the validity of the actual  models.  The basic answer  to all 
of the questions is that the recent  experience  of the current  account  can be 
thought  of as a normal response  of the economies  of the world to variations 
in  the shares  of government  spending  in the world economy, to cyclical 
fluctuations  and to diversities  in  rates  of growth  across  countries.  People 
who want government  protection  often  think  that foreign exchange  and other 
asset  markets are not working  correctly.  I  do not share  this opinion.  I 
think that  the stability  of government  policies and coordination  of policies 
across  countries  would  help ease the forecasting  problems that agents  face. 53 
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I  am grateful  to Patricia  Reynolds  for her research  assistance,  to Kellett 
Hannah  of the IMF and to Karl  Driessen  for assistance  in  obtaining  data  and 
to Lars Peter  Hansen  and  Masao Ogaki  for supplying  computer  software.  I 
thank  Dale Henderson,  Narayana  Kocherlakota,  Debbie  Lucas,  Bob McDonald, 
Allan  Meltzer,  Dan Siegel, Mark  Watson,  and the participants  in seminars  the 
Claremont  Graduate  School,  the International  Monetary  Fund,  Northwestern 
University,  and the University  of  Notre  Dame for helpful  conversations. 
1.  Calculations  are  from the 1987 Economic Reoort  of the President,  Tables  B- 
1 and B-99.  The sources  of  all data  used  in the paper  are described  in a 
data  appendix  that is available  directly  from  the author. 
2.  Ricardian  equivalence  is a property  of  the equilibrium  of an economy  in 
which the mix of financing  of  the government  sector between  bond issues  and 
taxation  does not matter. 
3.  Feldscein  and Bacchetta  (1987)  examine whether  the U.S.  dollar  has 
actually  fallen  significantly  relative  to  U.S.  trading partners.  They find, 
using the latest multilateral  trade weights  from  1984,  that the dollar 
appreciated  in real terms by 40% from  January  198D until  February  1985,  and 
that  by May 1987 it  had reversed  three-fourths  of the appreciation. 54 
4. Dornbusch  (1987)  reports  that  the real exchange  rate is the International 
Monetary  Funds's value-added  deflator  in manufacturing  from the IMF's 
International  Financial  Statistics.  The index  of  relative  levels  of real 
gross  domestic  spending  is constructed  from  a weighted  average  of 
interpolated  OECD annual  data  with  weights  given  by GNP shares. 
5.  Svensson  (1987) considers  an  alternative  but similar  model  with exogenous 
output  and  nominal  prices  that  are preset  one period  in advance. 
6. See Volume  21, No. 2/3 of the Journal  of  Monetary  Economics  for an 
introduction  to this growing body of  literature,  most of which is conducted 
in  a closed  economy  framework. 
7.  An unpublished  appendix  available  directly  from  the author  investigates 
the uniqueness  of the steady  state  of  the system  and of  the dynamic  path  to 
the stochastic  steady  state. 
8.  Evans  (1986) footnote  10 indicates  that  he uses a monthly  CNP deflator 
that  was constructed  by the Federal Reserve  Bank  of  Minneapolis.  The 
deflator  series  used  here is the quarterly  data  reported  by the U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce.  Evans's results  are less dramatic  when che quarterly 
deflator  is employed  than the deflator  for the last  month  of the quarter, 
although  the inference  is not changed  dramatically. 
9.  Flood, Hodrick  and Kaplan  (1987) examine  the evidence  for the stock market 
that  has been interpreted  as findings of  bubbles.  A critical  examination 
indicates  that changes  in required  expected  rates  of return  are more 
consistent  with the data.  Whether the changes  in expected  returns  are 
sufficient  to justify  the volatility  of stock prices  is an open  question.  A 
similar argument  can be applied  to the exchange  rate literature  that has 55 
purported to find  bubbles,  e.g. Evans  (1986) and Meese (1986). 
10. See Mussa's  (1986) discussion  of Krugman  (1986) for other  criticisms  of 
this approach. 
11.  Enge].  (1984)  first tested the risk neutral  specification  in this way. 
12.  In the formation of the optimal weighting matrix of the orthogonality  conditions I allowed for  the first  order  moving  average process induced  by 
forecasting  out two periods.  I employed  the Newey  and  West (1987) algorithm 
to keep the weighting  matrix  positive  definite. 
13. Feinman,  Garber,  and  Garfinkel  (1987)  discuss financial  warfare and the 
periodic  disruptions  of international  financial  markets  that characterize  the 
history  of  relations  across  countries. 
14. Hodrick  (1987) explores  the ability  of  changes  in  the conditional 
variances  of money and output  to explain  changes  in exchange  rates.  The 
theory  works better  than  the empirical  analysis  to  date. 56 
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